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Synopsis
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1982-1983
INTRODUCTION
This synopsis outlines significant developments in immigration law
from July 1982, through July 1983.1 The Supreme Court, the lower
federal courts, and Congress each had an impact on the develop-
ments which occurred in immigration law. The Supreme Court ad-
dressed the following important issues: the one-House veto of suspen-
sion of deportation; the proper forum for litigating the admissibility
of a lawful permanent resident after a brief trip abroad; the ability
of nonimmigrant aliens to establish domicile; and whether states
have standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief from viola-
tions of the immigration laws.
The lower federal courts rendered significant decisions regarding
the applicability of the exclusionary rule to deportation proceedings
and the constricts of search and seizure law. Areas which also de-
manded review by the lower courts were: the practice and conse-
quences of indefinite detention, the requirements for suspension of
deportation, and issues of entry and exclusion. The decisions of the
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals were not in complete accord
1. The July 1982 starting date coincides with the end of the previous synopsis arti-
cle. See 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 191 (1982). The July 1983 ending date coincides with
the adjournment of the Supreme Court's 1982-1983 term.
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during the year regarding the issues of the proper burden of proof in
an asylum application and the requirement of showing the criminal
intent of an alien charged with violating the immigration laws by
reentering the United States after deportation.
Congress was active in the immigration field as well. The Simp-
son-Mazzoli bill was re-introduced after dying in the lame-duck ses-
sion of Congress in late 1982. Legislation affecting Amerasian chil-
dren and eligibility for legal assistance from the Legal Services
Corporation was also enacted.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
During the 1982-1983 Term, the Supreme Court decided six cases
in the area of immigration law, giving two of these cases summary
treatment. 2 The Court denied review in nine other significant cases
involving various areas of immigration law.3 A discussion and analy-
2. INS v. Chadha, 15 U.S.L.W. 4907 (U.S. June 23, 1983); Landon v. Plasencia,
103 S. Ct. 321 (1982); Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 102 S. Ct. 3260
(1982); Toll v. Moreno, 102 S. Ct. 2977 (1982). In INS v. Miranda, 103 S. Ct. 281
(1982), the Court granted certiorari, but without hearing oral argument, summarily re-
versed the Ninth Circuit's decision that the INS was estopped by its unexplained delay
in adjudicating a visa petition. In United States v. Armijo-Martinez, 103 S. Ct. 34
(1982), the Court granted certiorari and summarily vacated and remanded the case to
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, 102 S. Ct. 3440 (1982).
3. The Court refused to review an unreported decision from the Eleventh Circuit
which convicted the petitioner on six counts of transporting undocumented aliens, a viola-
tion of § 274 (a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §
1324(a)(2) (1982). In Patterson v. United States, No. 82-1466, slip op. I (11th Cir. Nov.
16, 1983) cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3857 (U.S. May 31, 1983) (No. 82-1466), the
Court refused to review the trial court's jury instruction to the effect that conviction
could be based on assisting undocumented aliens to remain in the United States illegally,
rather than directly assisting such aliens to enter the country.
In Binder v. INS, 102 S. Ct. 2957 (1982) denying cert. to 667 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir.
1981), the Court refused to review the finding that an order of deportation based on the
alien's management of a house of prostitution, which is legal in the State of Nevada, was
not a denial of equal protection. The Court also declined to review a Fifth Circuit deci-
sion which held that an alien is not barred from suing in federal court for breach of
contract involving services rendered in the United States, regardless of allegations that
entry was gained with a fraudulently obtained visa. Oppenheim v. Moreau, 102 S. Ct.
3486 (1982) denying cert. to 663 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1982).
In Hill v. United States, 669 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 63
(1982), the Court refused to disturb a decision of the First Circuit which concluded that
the district court acted correctly in denying a motion to dismiss a nonimmigration crimi-
nal charge because a potential witness was deported. The Court of Appeals had held that
there was no denial of due process engendered by the deportation because the Govern-
ment had valid reasons for the deportation beyond its assessment of the witness's value to
the defense, and the defendant had failed to demonstrate that the witness would offer
meaningful evidence unobtainable from other sources. The Court in Mila v. District Di-
rector, 678 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 726 (1983), refused to
review petitioner's claim' that Tongan customary adoptions should be recognized under
the immigration laws.
The Court refused to reconsider petitioner's deportation order which was based on a
conviction prior to entry in Squires v. INS, 689 F.2d 1276 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
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sis of the cases which were decided on the merits of the claim
follows.
INS v. Chadha
The most significant Supreme Court decision rendered in the past
year was INS v. Chadha,4 wherein the Court held that a one-House
of Congress veto provision' contained in the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (INA) is unconstitutional. Although the decision arose
in an immigration context, it essentially nullifies similar veto provi-
sions contained in other federal legislation.'
The Attorney General of the United States acting through the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (INS) has been delegated the
responsibility by Congress of enforcing the INA. Section 244(a)(1)
103 S. Ct. 1874 (1983). The Court of Appeals had held that for purposes of the "petty
offense" exception of § 212(a)(9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(9) (1982), the equivalent offense under the District of Columbia Code at the
time of the alien's entry was determinative, rather than the parallel code which existed at
the time of the alien's conviction.
In INS v. Perez, 103 S. Ct. 320 (1982), dismissing appeal from 643 F.2d 640 (9th
Cir. 1981), the petition for certiorari was dismissed pursuant to Rule 53 (dismissal by
agreement). The INS' petition raised only the issue of the adequacy of a motion to reo-
pen in light of INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), where the motion was unsupported by
affidavits.
In Diaz-Salazar v. INS, 51 U.S.L.W. 3902 (U.S. June 20, 1983) denying cert. to 700
F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1983), the Court declined to review the Seventh Circuit's holding
that an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying a stay of deportation
while a motion to reopen deportation proceedings is pending, is not reviewable under §
106(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1982). The lower court had also found that the
Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motibn to reopen.
The Court also let stand a decision from the Fifth Circuit which denied a motion to
reopen, even though the BIA had placed great emphasis in its denial on adverse factors
which were used by the Board five years earlier in denying an application for suspension
of deportation. Marcello v. INS, 103 S. Ct. 1868 (1983), denying cert. to 694 F.2d 1033
(5th Cir. 1983).
4. 51 U.S.L.W. 4907 (U.S. June 23, 1983).
5. A "one-House veto" permits Congress to monitor or oversee the exercise of the
discretionary powers which it has delegated to the Executive branch. Typically, such a
provision allows one House of Congress to veto, by affirmative action or inaction, the
exercise of the power it delegated to the Executive branch. Absent a veto, the act or
proposal becomes law. For a fuller treatment and presentation of opposing views, see
Javits & Klien, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional
Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455 (1977); Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Respon-
sible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 VA. L. REV. 253 (1982); Nathanson, Separa-
tion of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the "Inde-
pendent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1064 (1981).
6. One commentator has placed the number of congressional veto provisions at
295. See, Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive
Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L. J. 323, 324 (1977).
7. § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982).
of the INA8 gives the Attorney General discretion to suspend depor-
tation proceedings and adjust the status of aliens when certain statu-
tory requirements are met.9 However, section 244(c)(2) 10 allows
Congress to pass a resolution contrary to the Attorney General's de-
termination that deportation of an alien should be suspended.
Chadha, an alien who overstayed his nonimmigrant student visa,
was granted suspension of deportation by an immigration judge. The
House of Representatives, however, by resolution without debate or
recorded vote, vetoed the suspension determination pursuant to sec-
tion 244(c)(2). Chadha challenged the one-House veto provision,
contending that the House's action was essentially legislative in pur-
pose and effect, and thus subject to Article I, Section 7 of the Con-
stitution, which requires legislation to be passed by a majority of
both houses of Congress and presented to the President before be-
coming law."'
After disposing of numerous protestations that the case was non-
justiciable,1 2 the Court analyzed the purposes and design of the sys-
tem of checks and balances, adopted by the Framers of the Constitu-
tion, to ensure a separation of the three branches of government.13
The Court concluded the constitutional provisions requiring present-
ment of the legislation to the President and bicameral approval "rep-
resents the Framer's decision that the legislative power of the Fed-
eral government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought
and exhaustively considered, procedure."14
Having established that the procedural requirements of Article I,
Section 7 must be strictly adhered to when the government enacts
legislation, the Court next considered whether Congress' action
under INA section 244(c)(2) is an exercise of legislative power. The
Court concluded that Congress had effectuated legislation because
the "legal rights, duties and relations of persons" '15 had been altered.
The fact that deportation of any alien could not be achieved until
8. § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1982).
9. Section 244(a)(1) of the United States Code provides that deportation may be
suspended if the alien has been physically present in the United States for seven years,
proves his good moral character, and the Attorney General is of the belief that deporta-
tion would constitute an extreme hardship on the alien, his spouse, parent, or child who is
a citizen of the United States or has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence. §
244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1982). See infra notes 139-51 and accompanying text.
10. § 244(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. §1254(c)(2).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
12. Congress argued that the Court was without appellate jurisdiction, that §
244(c)(2) of the Act could not be severed from § 244, that Chadha lacked standing, that
Chadha had alternative statutory relief available to him, that the case did not present a
genuine controversy because the INS agreed with Chadha's position, and that the case
presented a nonjusticiable political question. 51 U.S.L.W. 4910-14.
13. Id. at 4914-16.
14. Id. at 4916.
15. Id.
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legislation requiring such deportation was enacted was used as addi-
tional support for the Court's conclusion that Congress' action was
legislative in character. As final support for its decision, the Court
noted that the veto provision in INA section 244(c)(2) does not
come within the narrowly prescribed situations enumerated in the
Constitution that allow one House of Congress to act exclusively of
the other."'
The Court's resolution of Chadha wrested ultimate determination
on suspension of deportation from Congress under the current dele-
gation of powers of the Attorney General. The decision may elimi-
nate Congressional veto provisions in other statutes delegating au-
thority to executive and administrative agencies.
Landon v. Plasencia
In Landon v. Plasencia,17 the Court unanimously 8 reversed a
Ninth Circuit holding 9 that an exclusion hearing is an impermissi-
ble proceeding for litigating whether a lawful permanent resident
may return to the United States after a brief visit abroad.
Plasencia was lawfully admitted to the United States as a perma-
nent resident from her native El Salvador in 1970. In 1975, after a
brief visit to Mexico where she agreed to assist in the illegal entry of
Salvadoran and Mexican nationals, Plasencia was held at the port of
entry20 and charged with attempting to smuggle aliens into the
16. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 6 gives the House the power to initiate impeach-
ments. Art. I, § 3, cl. 5 gives the Senate the power to conduct trials following impeach-
ment charges and to convict on such charges. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 gives the Senate the
power to approve presidential appointments. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 gives the Senate the power
to ratify treaties entered into by the President.
17. 103 S. Ct. 321 (1982).
18. Justice Marshall filed a separate opinion, concurring in the majority's resolu-
tion of the type of proceeding a re-entering resident alien can be afforded, but dissented
from the order to remand on the question of whether respondent was denied due process.
103 S. Ct. at 332 (1982)(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19. 637 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd 103 S. Ct. 321 (1982).
20. Section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides in part:
(a) The inspection ... of aliens (including alien crewmen) seeking admission
or readmission to . . . the United States shall be conducted by immigration
officers, except as otherwise provided in regard to special inquiry officers. All
aliens arriving at ports of the United States shall be examined by one or more
immigration officers at the discretion of the Attorney General and under such
regulations as he may prescribe. ...
(b) Every alien... who may not appear to the examining immigration of-
ficer at the port of arrival to be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land shall
be detained for further inquiry to be conducted by a special inquiry officer.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (1982).
United States.21 In an exclusion proceeding, the Immigration Judge
determined that Plasencia's return was an "entry" as defined in §101
(a)(13) of the INA22 because her trip abroad was "meaningfully in-
terruptive" of her residence in the United States.23 Upon clear and
convincing evidence that Plasencia had aided an alien in illegally en-
tering the country, the INS ordered her excluded and deported.
Plasencia filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that
because she was a permanent resident she was entitled to have the
issue of "entry" litigated in a deportation proceeding with its attend-
ant procedural safeguards.24
The Supreme Court, examining the language and legislative his-
tory of the INA, concluded that regardless of the residency status of
the alien, admissibility is to be determined in an exclusion hearing.
"Nothing in the statutory language or the legislative history suggests
that the respondent's status as a permanent resident entitles her to a
suspension of the exclusion hearing or requires the INS to proceed
only through a deportation hearing. 25 The Court rejected the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning that the denial of a deportation proceeding is
"manifestly unfair" and in contravention of both the spirit and the
scope of Rosenberg v. Fleuti,26 which held that a brief, unintended
21. Section 212(a)(31) of the INA excludes from admission into the United
States: "Any alien who at any time shall have, knowingly and for gain, encouraged,
induced, assisted, abetted or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United
States in violation of law." Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(31), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(31) (1982).
22. Section 101(a)(31), defines "entry" as:
[A]ny coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or
from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily or otherwise, except that an
alien having a lawful permanent residence in the United States shall not be
regarded as making an entry into the United States for the purposes of the
immigration laws if the alien proves to the satisfaction of the Attorney General
that his departure to a foreign port or place or to an outlying possession was not
intended or reasonably to be expected by him or his presence in a foreign port or
place or in an outlying possession was not voluntary: Provided, That no person
whose departure from the United States was occasioned by deportation proceed-
ings, extradition, or other legal process shall be held to be entitled to such
exception.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(31), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1982).
23. In Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963), the Court articulated sev-
eral factors for determining "meaningful" interruption, including the purpose of the visit,
the length of absence, and the necessity of procuring travel documents. See infra notes
26, 139-49 and accompanying text.
24. Deportation proceedings differ from exclusion proceedings in several ways. For
example, the burden of proof on the Government in a deportation proceeding is much
higher than in an exclusion proceeding. In terms of judicial review of administrative
decisions, the alien in deportation proceedings may seek review from the court of appeals,
while exclusion orders may only be reviewed in habeas corpus proceedings. For further
procedural and substantive distinctions, see Note, Statutory and Constitutional Limita-
tions on the Indefinite Detention of Excludable Aliens, 62 B.U.L. REv. 553 (1982).
25. 103 S. Ct. at 326-27.
26. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
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departure from the country should not subject an alien to the conse-
quences of an "entry."
The Court recognized Plasencia's right to due process within the
context of her exclusion hearing,27 and remanded the case for resolu-
tion of this issue.28
Toll v. Moreno
The Supreme Court, in Toll v. Moreno,29 held that the University
of Maryland's policy of categorically denying "in-state" status, with
its concomitant tuition and admission advantages, to domiciled G-4
nonimmigrants30 and their families, is invalid under the Supremacy
Clause.31 The respondents were students at the University of Mary-
land when suit commenced. They resided in Maryland with their
parents, nonimmigrant aliens and holders of G-4 visas. Despite re-
spondents' residence in the State, for the requisite time to qualify for
in-state status, the University denied them in-state status pursuant
to a University policy of denying such status to all nonimmigrant
aliens due to their inability to demonstrate an intent to live perma-
nently or indefinitely in Maryland.-2
Respondents filed a class action against the University of Mary-
land, contending that the University's policy violated the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment,33 the
27. 103 S. Ct. at 330-32. However, the Court stated that such due process rights
may be lost if the permanent resident alien's absence is'extended. Id. at 330.
28. Among the possible deficiencies noted by the Court were: the eleven hour no-
tice of the exclusion hearing; improper allocation of the burden of proof; waiver of right
to representation without a full understanding of the right or the ramifications of waiving
it. Id. at 330-31.
29. 102 S.Ct. 2977 (1982).
30. G-4 visas are issued to nonimmigrant aliens who are officers or employees of
enumerated international organizations, and to their immediate families. Immigration
and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(G)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(15)(G)(iv) (1982).
31. 102 S. Ct. at 2977, 2986. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Author-
ity of the United States shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U. S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
32. 102 S. Ct. at 2979.
33. The Fourteenth Amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, §1.
supremacy clause, and various federal laws. The District Court
granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs and the class
they represented. In the court's view, the University's policy had cre-
ated an irrebuttable presumption of inability to establish Maryland
domicile by G-4 aliens. This, the court concluded, was "not univer-
sally true"3' 4 as a matter of federal or state law. The policy, there-
fore, violated the due process clause.35 The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.30
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court, in El-
kins v. Moreno,37 agreed that as a matter of federal law the pre-
sumption was not universally true. The Court, however, certified the
remaining question, the validity of the presumption under state law,
to the Maryland Court of Appeals. That court found nothing in Ma-
ryland law which rendered G-4 aliens incapable of establishing state
domicile s.3
After the Supreme Court decision in Elkins, but before the state
court response, the University reaffirmed its exclusion policy in a
"clarifying resolution." The University abandoned its position that
G-4 aliens were incapable of establishing Maryland domicile. In-
stead, the University based its exclusion policy on a "number of sub-
stantial purposes and interests,"3 9 including a desire to grant greater
tuition subsidies to those individuals more likely to remain in the
State and contribute to the State's economic well-being, administra-
tive efficiency, and the prevention of disparate treatment of
nonimmigrants.
Following the Maryland Court of Appeals decision, certiorari was
again granted by the Supreme Court. Holding that the University's
revamped resolution raised new constitutional issues, the Court va-
cated the Court of Appeals judgment and remanded the case.40
On remand, the District Court held, with respect to the period
prior to the resolution, that the University's policy violated due pro-
cess by establishing a conclusive presumption that a nonimmigrant
34. Moreno v. University of Maryland, 420 F. Supp. 541, 559-60 (D. Md. 1976).
35. Id. The district court relied on the Supreme Court's due process analysis in
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). Viandis involved a Connecticut statute which
classified certain married couples admitted for admission to the University of Connecti-
cut as out-of-state students based on the applicant's legal address prior to or at the time
of application for admission. The Court held the statute to be violative of the Due Pro-
cess Clause because it denied resident tuition rates on the basis of a permanent and
irrebuttable presumption of non-residence, when the presumption was not always true in
fact. 412 U.S. at 452.
36. Moreno v. Elkins, 556 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1977).
37. 435 U.S. 647 (1978).
38. Toll v. Moreno, 284 Md. 425, 444, 397 A.2d 1009, 1019 (1979).
39. 102 S. Ct. at 2981.
40. Toll v. Moreno, 441 U.S. 458 (1979) (per curiam).
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could not have a Maryland domicile.41 With respect to the clarifying
resolution, wherein domicile was no longer the paramount considera-
tion in granting in-state status, the court concluded that the policy
violated the equal protection clause42 and the supremacy clause by
encroaching upon the federal government's power over the regulation
of immigration. The Court of Appeals affirmed, per curiam.43
The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the resolution to be in viola-
tion of the supremacy clause. After recognizing "the preeminent role
of the Federal Government with respect to the regulation of
aliens," 44 the Court reiterated the principle that "state regulation
not congressionally sanctioned that discriminates against aliens law-
fully admitted to the country is impermissible if it imposes additional
burdens not contemplated by Congress. '' 45 The Court found it signif-
icant that Congress had allowed G-4 aliens the opportunity to estab-
lish domicile in the United States, whereas other categories of non-
immigrants were barred from doing so. Furthermore, the Court
pointed to additional affirmative steps taken by the Federal Govern-
ment, in the form of special tax privileges, designed to facilitate the
immigration of international organizations and their employees to
the United States. According to the Court, Maryland's policy of de-
nying in-state status to the G-4 alien frustrated these federal policies
in contravention of the supremacy clause and amounted to a burden
not contemplated by Congress.
The Court avoided consideration of the due process and equal pro-
tection arguments relied upon by the lower courts, but reiterated the
validity of its recent decisions upholding a state's right to limit the
participation of non-citizens in the governmental process without vio-
lating the equal protection clause.' 6
41. 480 F. Supp. 1116, 1122-25 (D. Md. 1979).
42. In the view of the district court, the clarifying resolution created an alienage
classification which had to fall under strict scrutiny because the state failed to justify the
classification with a requisite compelling state interest. See infra note 46 and accompany-
ing text.
43. Moreno v. University of Maryland, 645 F.2d 217, 220-21 (4th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam).
44. 102 S. Ct. at 2982.
45. Id. at 2983 (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 n.6 (1976)).
46. 102 S. Ct. at 2983 n.17. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger,
wrote a vehement dissent, contending that the state's classification was not suspect and
should only be subjected to minimal scrutiny. 102 S. Ct. at 2990-3002 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico
In Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico,47 the Court con-
cluded that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has standing as
parens patriae48 to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against Vir-
ginia defendants for alleged discrimination against Puerto Rican
temporary farm workers in violation of the Wagner-Peyser Act49 and
a provision of the INA authorizing admission of temporary workers
into the United States.5"
Puerto Rico charged that defendants engaged in preferential hir-
ing treatment of Jamaican workers in violation of the Wagner-Pey-
ser Act which requires clearance of an interstate system for locating
domestic laborers before an employer may hire foreign laborers.5 1
The Supreme Court held parens patriae standing arises if the
state has an articulable interest independent of the private parties
involved. The Court recognized two categories of such quasi-sover-
eign interests: the State's interest in the general economic and physi-
cal well-being of its residents and the State's interest in ensuring
that it is not being discriminatorily denied its status within the fed-
eral system. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico manifested both in-
terests. Seeking to protect its residents from the cancerous effects of
ethnic discrimination, Puerto Rico manifested an interest in its eco-
nomic well-being. Alternatively, the Commonwealth's participation
in the federal employment scheme and its desire for its residents to
reap the full benefits of such legislation was found to be a quasi-
sovereign interest, vesting Puerto Rico with parens patriae stand-
ing.52 The Court, however, in defining interests which enable a state
to vindicate the federal rights of its citizens, did not abandon the ad
hoc approach it has taken with parens patriae actions.
47. 102 S. Ct. 3260 (1982).
48. The concept of parens patriae (parent of the country), as developed in the
United States, grants standing to a state if it is able to assert an injury to a "quasi-
sovereign" interest. See note 52 infra and accompanying text. See also, Curtis, The
Checkered Career of Parens Patriae, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 895 (1976).
49. 102 S. Ct. at 3270. The Wagner-Peyser National Employment System Act
created the United States Employment Service to promote a national system of public
employment offices. Wagner-Peyser National Employment System Act, Ch. 49, 48 Stat.
113 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
50. 102 S. Ct. at 3270. Section 101(a)(15)(H)(ii) of the INA authorizes admission
of temporary workers into the United States if unemployed persons in the country are
unable to fill available positions. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii), 8
U.S.C. § l101(a)(15)(H)(ii) (1982).
51. For purposes of the Wagner-Peyser Act, Puerto Rico is included in the federal-
state system established by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 49b(b) (1976).
52. 102 S. Ct. at 3269-71.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Many of the past year's significant immigration decisions involved
criminal procedure issues. The Ninth Circuit, with a decidedly lib-
eral bent, ruled on the use of the exclusionary rule in deportation
proceedings and the boundaries of permissible searches and seizures
of aliens.
Ninth Circuit Decisions
Once an alien has been admitted to the United States and has
passed examination by immigration officers, he can only be expelled
from the country through deportation proceedings.5 3 In Lopez-Men-
doza v. INS," the Ninth Circuit held that the exclusionary rule55
applies in deportation proceedings.
Lopez and Sandoval were arrested along with 35 others by INS
agents in a search for undocumented aliens at a Washington potato
processing plant. Both made pre-hearing admissions to INS agents
that they were illegally in the country, but they refused to depart
voluntarily. An INS agent completed Form 1-213, 5' stating that
Sandoval was an alien who had entered the United States without
inspection and was deportable.5 Sandoval refused to testify at his
deportation hearing, attempting instead to suppress his admission be-
cause it was the product of an arrest violative of the fourth amend-
ment.5 8 However, the Immigration Judge found no violation of the
fourth amendment in Sandoval's detention.59 Sandoval was ordered
deported on the basis of his admission. The Ninth Circuit reversed
Sandoval's deportation order, holding that his arrest was not predi-
cated on probable cause, that his statements were the fruit of an
53. See generally, 1A C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMmIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 5.1-5.21 (rev. ed. 1981).
54. 705 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1983).
55. The exclusionary rule is a judicially created doctrine which excludes evidence
derived by exploitation of an unconstitutional search or seizure when it is offered in a
criminal proceeding to prove guilt or its equivalent. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963). See generally Note, The Exclusionary Rule in Deportation Proceed-
ings: A Time for Alternatives, 14 J. IN'L LAW & ECON. 349 (1980).
56. Form 1-213, entitled "Record of Deportable Alien" is comparable to a police
report. It provides biographical data and the circumstances of the alien's entry into the
United States.
57. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1982)
(an alien who enters the United states without inspection is deportable).
58. 705 F.2d at 1060.
59. 705 F.2d at 1062. Lopez made the same argument in his deportation hearing,
but the immigration judge, holding that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in deporta-
tion proceedings, never reached the issue. Id. at 1061.
illegal arrest, and that the exclusionary rule bars the INS from using
such statements in deportation proceedings.60
The court summarily concluded that the actions of the INS agents
were arrests absent probable cause.61 In determining the applicabil-
ity of the exclusionary rule to deportation proceedings, which have
historically been deemed civil in nature, 2 the court utilized the anal-
ysis of United States v. Janis." In Janis, the Supreme Court held
that in a civil tax proceeding the exclusionary rule does not bar the
federal government from using evidence seized by state law enforce-
ment officers in violation of the fourth amendment. Interpreting
Janis as an advocation of selective use of the exclusionary rule, the
Ninth Circuit focused on whether the exclusionary rule should be
applied in civil cases involving "intrasovereign violation,"' '  as op-
posed to the intersovereign transgression involved in Janis. Using de-
terrence of future unlawful conduct as a touchstone rather than the
civil nature of the proceedings," the majority concluded that the de-
terrent effect of the exclusionary rule is maximized in situations
where the offending enforcement officer and the prosecutor are mem-
bers of the same government agency, sharing the common goal of
prosecution.66 Moreover, the extent to which immigration officers are
already subject to the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule
outside the deportation context was found by the court to be mini-
mal. Application of the exclusionary sanction to intrasovereign trans-
gression would therefore produce a "substantial and efficient"67 de-
terrent effect.
60. The court vacated Lopez's order for deportation and remanded to consider the
lawfulness of Lopez's detention. Id. at 1061.
61. Id. at 1062-63. The aliens were originally detained in the men's room of the
factory and then transported to the Franklin County jail. The court concluded that San-
doval was under arrest at the time he was interrogated at the jail, basing its conclusion
on Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)(the detention of a person in a police
station interrogation room must be supported by probable cause), and its own recent
decision in ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1982)(factory surveys violate the
fourth amendment absent reasonable and articulable suspicion that each questioned alien
is illegally in the country). For a further discussion of ILGWU v. Sureck see infra notes
72-85 and accompanying text.
62. See Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276, 285
(1966).
63. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
64. 705 F.2d at 1067-68. "Intrasovereign violations" occur when the officer com-
mitting the unconstitutional search or seizure is an agent of the same sovereign that
seeks to use the evidence. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 455-56, n. 31.
65. In a footnote, the court, relying on One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,
380 U.S. 693 (1965), argued alternatively that deportation proceedings could be charac-
terized as quasi-criminal, thereby justifying application of the exclusionary rule. 705
F.2d at 1065, n. 9.
66. 705 F.2d at 1070.
67. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453 (1976). See also Schroeder, Deter-
ring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEo. L.
J. 1361 (1981).
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The court employed empirical balancing in its last step under the
Janis analysis, determining whether the social cost of invoking the
exclusionary rule outweighs its deterrent effect.6 S The majority
opined that the number of aliens likely to benefit from invoking the
exclusionary rule paled in comparison to the number of aliens
streaming across the border. The court thus concluded that the de-
terrent benefit far outweighs the social cost of applying the rule in
deportation proceedings.e9 Alternatives to the exclusionary rule, pro-
pounded in an administrative decision by the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA),70 were dismissed as "unrealistic and unaccept-
able."7 1
In ILGWU v. Sureck, 2 the Ninth Circuit held INS factory
surveys constitute an unreasonable seizure violative of the fourth
amendment absent reasonable and articulable suspicion that each
questioned worker is an alien illegally in the United States. Pursuant
to an INS factory survey,73 two U.S. citizens and two permanent
resident aliens were questioned regarding their citizenship status.
Appellants 4 argued that the INS action constituted bodily seizure
because they were detained and questioned in the custody of the
INS agents.7 5 Although the court disagreed with appellants' conten-
68. 705 F.2d at 1071-73 (applying the test set forth in United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433, 447-60 (1976)).
69. 705 F.2d at 1073. A sharp dissent by four judges maintained that the major-
ity's new rule of evidence would add greater economic burdens by encouraging aliens to
demand a deportation hearing and lessen the efficient enforcement of the immigration
laws. Id. at 1075-95 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
70. In re Sandoval, 17 1. & N. Dec. 70 (1979). Among the alternatives espoused
were private damage suits against INS officers, injunctive relief, and internal INS sanc-
tions. For a further discussion of alternatives to the exclusionary rule, see Schroeder,
supra note 67. For a discussion of the Board of Immigration Appeals and its function,
see, Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1 (1980); Roberts, The Board of Immigration Appeals: A Critical Appraisal, 15
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29 (1977).
71. 705 F.2d at 1073.
72. 681 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1982).
73. An INS factory survey involves the positioning of INS agents at exits in a
factory while detentive questioning of the entire work force is conducted on the suspicion
that some of the workers may be illegal aliens. 681 F.2d at 626.
74. The ILGWU, certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of the em-
ployees at the two factories involved, and the four individuals, brought the class action
challenging the INS factory surveys. The District Court dismissed the union as a party
and denied the motion to certify the class. In December 1979 and January 1980, the
court granted INS motions for summary judgment and these consolidated appeals fol-
lowed. 681 F.2d at 626.
75. The court did not decide whether search warrants, procured where consent was
denied by factory owners, were defective as the court was persuaded that the conduct of
the INS during the factory surveys violated the fourth amendment rights of the workers.
tion that factory surveys are similar to arrests requiring probable
cause to arrest, the court did accept the characterization of factory
surveys as seizures of the work force. 6 Given the intrusive nature
and threatening execution of the survey, the court concluded that,
even prior to individual questioning, a reasonable worker "would
have believed that he was not free to leave.""
Following its conclusion that factory surveys, conducted pursuant
to INS procedures, constitute a fourth amendment seizure, the court
considered the constitutional standard applicable to INS factory sur-
vey questioning.7 8 After analyzing Ninth Circuit case law and extra-
polating from recent Supreme Court pronouncements, 9 the court
concluded that "INS investigators may not seize or detain workers
for citizenship status questioning unless the investigators are able to
articulate objective facts providing investigators with a reasonable
suspicion that each questioned person, so detained, is an alien ille-
gally in this country." 80 Requiring a reasonable suspicion of illegality
also assures that citizens and aliens legally in the country will not be
subjected to the type of arbitrary government action prohibited by
the fourth amendment. To comply with the fourth amendment rights
of all workers involved, the predicate for detentive questioning must
be a reasonable and individualized suspicion of illegal alienage
rather than reasonable suspicion that someone is an alien.81
In requiring individualized suspicion, the Ninth Circuit rejected
681 F.2d at 629.
76. Id. at 630, 634. The court relied on its language in United States v. Anderson,
663 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1981): "[A] person has been 'seized' within the meaning of
the fourth amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident,
a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Id. at 939 (quot-
ing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
77. 681 F.2d at 634.
78. Id. An INS agent has statutory authority under § 287(a)(1) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, to question a person as to his right to be or remain in the
United States without implicating the fourth amendment, provided the agent has a rea-
sonable belief that the questioned person is an alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (1982). A
seizure complies with the fourth amendment if the officer can articulate a reasonable
suspicion that the questioned person is an illegal alien. Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 217
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971). See also, Ojeda-Vinales v. INS, 523
F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1975).
79. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (limited intrusions on the personal
security of detained persons may be made on less than probable cause, provided the
police have an articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity); United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411 (1981) (investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifesta-
tion that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity).
80. 681 F.2d at 683.
81. See supra note 78. In a case which was decided after ILGWU, a Washington
district court permanently enjoined INS agents from entering farm labor housing in
search of undocumented workers, absent a search warrant or individualized suspicion
supported by "articulable objective facts" that each person seized was illegally in the
country. La Duke v. Nelson, 560 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wash. 1982).
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the government's argument that United States v. Martinez-Fuerte82
should control. The court reasoned that factory surveys are more
similar to roving patrols than permanent checkpoints, and that the
individualized suspicion standard articulated in United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce8 3 should apply. By refusing to accept the govern-
ment's analogy, the court rejected the Third Circuit's ruling in
Babula v. INS,84 to the extent that it held factory survey questioning
constitutionally permissible on less than a particularized suspicion.
The INS subsequently filed a certiorari petition seeking review of
ILGWU v. Sureck."5
The Ninth Circuit, in Zepeda v. INS,8 distinguished its ILGWU
holding. The Zepeda court, though affirming the issuance of a pre-
liminary injunction against certain INS investigatory policies, re-jected the district court's conclusion that the mere approach of per-
sons for questioning constitutes a seizure within the fourth
amendment.87 The court held that the approach of a residence by an
INS agent, for the purpose of questioning persons within, does not
implicate constitutional rights.88 Moreover, to enjoin such a basic
right of approach would preclude the efficient enforcement of immi-
gration laws. The stationing of agents at exits and entrances of the
factory in ILGWU distinguished that case from the situation of mere
approach.
82. 428 U.S. 543 (1976)(the practice of referring certain vehicles to secondary
inspection areas at permanent checkpoints for further questioning on less than particular-
ized suspicion is constitutional).
83. 422 U.S. 873 (1974). "Except at the border and its functional equivalents,
officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable
facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspi-
cion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country." Id. at 884.
84. 665 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1981).
85. INS v. Delgado, 51 U.S.L.W. 3774 (U.S. April 26, 1983).
86. 708 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1983).
87. Id. at 362. The District Court enjoined the Service from: (1) entering a resi-
dence or nonpublic area of business without consent, warrant, or exigent circumstance;(2) engaging in general searches of homes or nonpublic areas of businesses, unless inci-
dent to arrest or when exigent circumstances dictate; (3) detaining and questioning per-
sons concerning their immigration status without reasonable suspicion that the persons
detained are illegally in the country; and (4) arresting persons absent a warrant or prob-
able cause to believe the person is illegally in the country and likely to escape before a
warrant is procured. The Court of Appeal upheld these prohibitions. 708 F.2d at 358-59.
88. See, Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, 588 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1979); Cordon de Ruano
v. INS, 554 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1979).
Unlawful Intent In a §276 Charge
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals disagreed regarding
the Government's burden of proving unlawful intent in INA §27689
cases charging aliens with unlawful reentry into the United States
after deportation. Pursuant to §276, an alien who has been arrested
and deported or excluded and deported and thereafter enters the
United States is guilty of a felony. In 1968, Pena-Cabanillas v.
United States0 held that, to prosecute a §276 charge, the Govern-
ment need only prove that the accused is an alien and that he ille-
gally entered the United States after deportation had been executed.
The court stated that there was no indication in the statute that a
specific intent to reenter need be shown.91 The Court construed the
statute as a regulatory statute without basis in any common law
crime; the offense was deemed mala prohibita, or a public welfare
offense, wherein intent is implied once it is shown that the defendant
voluntarily committed the forbidden act.92
The Sixth, Second, and Tenth Circuits agreed with the Ninth Cir-
cuit's reasoning in cases decided during the past year. In United
States v. Hussein93 the Sixth Circuit held that the district court did
not err in failing to instruct the jury that a specific unlawful intent
by the defendants must exist before a guilty verdict for violation of
INA §276 could be returned. The court reiterated the holding and
reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Pena-Cabanillas. The Second Cir-
cuit in United States v. Newton,94 similarly concurred with Pena-
Cabanillas, but did not totally foreclose the possibility of a good
faith defense.9 5 Because the good faith instruction was not requested
in a timely fashion, however, the court did not resolve its viability as
a defense. The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Hernandez,96 simi-
larly relied on Pena-Cabanillas, concluding that showing specific un-
lawful intent is not an element of the felony of unlawful reentry.
The Seventh Circuit, however, rejected the reasoning of Pena-
Cabanillas in United States v. Anton.9 7 The court disagreed with the
89. Immigration and Nationality Act § 276, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1982).
90. 394 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1968).
91. Id. at 789.
92. Id. at 788-89. See generally Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L.
REV. 55 (1933).
93. 675 F.2d 114, 116 (6th Cir. 1982).
94. 677 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1982).
95. Id at 17. Section 276 of the INA states that a deported alien commits a crime
if he is found in the United States, "unless" he has the "express" consent of the Attorney
General to re-enter the country. Immigration and Nationality Act § 276, 8 U.S.C. §
1326 (1982). The good faith defense contends that the alien who enters the country with
a reasonable belief that the Attorney General had consented is innocent of the crime. See
677 F.2d at 17. See generally W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 356-57 (1972).
96. 693 F.2d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1982).
97. 683 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1982).
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characterization of §276 as a mala prohibita offense. The court rea-
soned that such offenses are minor violations of laws or regulations
passed for the safety and health of the community and usually do
not carry severe sanctions. 98 Section 276, however, is a felony pun-
ishable by imprisonment and/or fines and should, therefore, require
a showing of criminal intent.99 The Seventh Circuit further dis-
agreed with the Ninth Circuit that Congress' intent was to eliminate
the specific intent requirement. 100 The court concluded that the
alien's belief that he had the consent of the Attorney General to re-
enter the country constituted a mistake-of-law, making it unjust to
levy criminal sanctions upon him.101 The court thus gave viability to
a good faith defense in the face of an INA §276 charge.10 2
ASYLUM
Prior to 1968, the INS and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),
under section 243(h) of the INA,108 required an asylum applicant to
show a "clear probability" of persecution in the country to which he
was being deported.104 In 1968, however, the United States acceded
to the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
which defined a refugee as one outside his country owing to a "well-
founded fear of being persecuted."105 In In re Dunar10 the BIA de-
termined that there was no substantial difference between the two
burdens; both required objective evidence manifesting a realistic
probability of persecution. The Refugee Act of 1980107 modified sec-
tion 243(h) to conform to "the well-founded fear" language of the
Protocol.
98. The court recognized a narrow class of mala prohibita offenses exists "for
which substantial penalties have been found to be justified." 683 F.2d at 1015. See
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (shipping adulterated and mis-
branded drugs); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (selling narcotics).
99. 683 F.2d at 1017.
100. 683 F.2d at 1015-16.
101. Id. at 1018.
102. The dissenting judge criticized the majority for going against the weight of
authority and for "[dumping] another case onto the crowded lap of the Supreme Court."
Id. 1021 (Posner, J., dissenting).
103. Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. §1253(h) (1982). This
section authorizes the Attorney General to withhold deportation of any alien whose life
or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion, if deported.
104. See, e.g., Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1003 (1969); Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1967).
105. 19 U.S.T. 6257, 606 U.N.T.S. 268.
106. 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973).
107. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in various sections of 8 U.S.C.).
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
A rift in the Circuit Courts of Appeals concerning the proper bur-
den of proof in asylum applications widened as a result of the differ-
ing language and decisional law. In February, 1983, the Supreme
Court granted the government's petition for certiorari to review
Stevic v. Sava.""8 The Second Circuit had stated in Stevic'09 that the
changes engendered by the Act were unambiguous concerning Con-
gress' intention to conform the INA to the U.N. Protocol; therefore,
the BIA's "clear probability" standard was too onerous.110
The Sixth Circuit in Reyes v. INS,"' addressed the burden of
proof question and agreed with the Second Circuit's determination in
Stevic that the clear probability standard is inconsistent with recent
legislative pronunciations. The Sixth Circuit, like the Second Cir-
cuit, did not delineate the evidence needed to establish a well-
founded fear of persecution. However, the Reyes court did note that
there must be more than the mere testimony of the alien in support
of the claim.11 2
The Third Circuit, however, sharply rejected the Second Circuit's
interpretation. In Rejaie v. INS,"13 the court concluded that the
Stevic court had misconstrued the legislative history of the 1968 ac-
cession to the Protocol and to the Refugee Act, and had inade-
quately considered case law'" 4 stating that the two standards were
equivalent. The legislative modification of §243(h) was deemed irrel-
evant to the clear probability standard and was discounted by the
Third Circuit as mere "cosmetic surgery"11 5 to bring the language of
the Protocol and domestic law into conformity.
The District Courts
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia, in a different context, also faced the issue of the proper burden
of proof in establishing persecution. In Almirol v. INS"16 the court
held that the "well-founded fear" standard is the correct burden of
proof where "persecution" is required to waive the foreign residence
108. 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nom INS v. Stevic, 51
U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. March 1, 1983) (No 82-973).
109. 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982).
110. Id. at 409.
111. 693 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1982).
112. The court held the testimony of Reyes and affidavits from relatives, general
newspaper and documentary reports concerning conditions in the Philippines, and a letter
from an official of the Catholic Church in the Philippines sufficient to meet the well-
founded fear burden. Id. at 600.
113. 691 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1982).
114. See, e.g., Kashani v. INS, 542 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977).
115. 691 F.2d at 146.
116. 550 F. Supp. 253, 256 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
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requirement of INA §212(e). 117 Because the issue was one of first
impression for the district court and the legislative history regarding
the section was barren of any interpretations, the court looked to the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Pereira-Diaz v. INS,"8 which established
the propriety of the "well-founded fear" standard in reviewing asy-
lum applications.
The Refugee Act of 1980 and the United Nations Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees were also cited in Nunez v. Boldin,1" 9
holding that an alien is entitled to be notified of his right to apply for
asylum before he is caused to depart, whether voluntarily or by de-
portation. The court found additional support for its temporary in-
junction requiring the INS to notify the detainees of their right to
apply for political asylum in the fifth amendment's due process guar-
antee.1 20 The court held the political asylum applicant may be de-
prived of life, liberty, and property by deportation. The applicable
regulations only required the INS to notify an alien of his right to
apply for political asylum or withholding of deportation where de-
portation proceedings had already commenced. "The present proce-
dures," the court concluded, "do not sufficiently assure that genuine
asylum claims will be heard, nor do they assure that an alien subject
to persecution will not be returned to the country of his
persecutors. 1
21
Similarly, in Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith,1 22 a California district
court issued preliminary injunctions prohibiting the INS from coerc-
ing Salvadoran aliens into signing voluntary departure forms and re-
quiring the INS to advise the aliens of their rights to apply for asy-
lum and a deportation hearing before requesting the aliens to depart
voluntarily. 2 3 The court concluded that in order to execute informed
117. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (1982).
118. 551 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1977).
119. 537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
120. 537 F. Supp. at 584-87. The due process clause requires that life, liberty, or
property shall not be deprived by the Federal Government without due process of law. In
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Supreme Court asserted a framework
for the "specific dictates of due process" in each particular case, requiring consideration
of three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the Government's action;(2) the risk of deprivation of life, liberty, or property through current procedures, and the
probable value of new or additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government's
fiscal and administrative interests in new or additional procedures. Id. at 339-49.
121. 537 F. Supp. at 586.
122. 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
123. The Attorney General is authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(g) (1982), to al-
low certain classes of deportable aliens to voluntarily depart from the United States. An
alien in this situation admits to being in the country illegally and no hearing is con-
waivers 22 of the right to apply for asylum and the right to a depor-
tation hearing, aliens must receive notice of these rights. The court
recognized, as did the Nunez court, that this new procedure will be
burdensome for the INS and may lead to frivolous asylum applica-
tions; however, in balancing these recognized hardships against an
alien's right to apply for asylum and a deportation hearing, "the
scales tip sharply in favor of Plaintiffs.". 
25
The Board of Immigration Appeals
Once deportation proceedings have been instituted, the merit of an
alien's asylum is determined by an immigration judge.120 The BIA
issued two significant decisions regarding the presentation of such
claims in the immigration courts. In In re Exame, 27 the BIA con-
cluded that an immigration judge denied an alien a full and fair
opportunity to present his asylum claim by refusing to admit back-
ground evidence on the general conditions in the alien's homeland,
Haiti. The BIA stated that while such evidence will not be sufficient
in and of itself to establish a persecution claim, it should be consid-
ered, provided the background evidence is relevant, material, and
noncumulative. In In re Exilus,1 28 the Board found no prejudice in
an immigration judge's refusal to allow an alien to submit interroga-
tories to the State Department regarding its conclusion contained in
an advisory opinion that the alien failed to establish a well-founded
fear of persecution. The decision stated such a refusal was not a de-
nial of due process, nor was the immigration judge's denial of a si-
multaneous translation of the entire exclusion proceeding.
DETENTION AND DENIAL OF PAROLE
Prior to the early 1980's the INS paroled aliens seeking admission
into the United States under INA § 212(d)(5)129 rather than physi-
cally incarcerating them. Physical incarceration was only utilized
when the alien posed a security risk to the public safety if paroled or
if the alien was likely to abscond before being deported.130 In 1981,
the INS changed its detention policy in response to the Cuban and
Haitian influx to a more restrictive use of parole and increased use
of physical detention."31
ducted. The alien is informed of his right to request a hearing.
124. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (a waiver of rights must be
knowingly and intelligently made when a life or liberty interest is threatened).
125. 541 F. Supp. at 380.
126. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1983).
127. I.D. 2920 (BIA 1982).
128. I.D. 2914 (BIA 1982).
129. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1982).
130. See Lewis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 978-81 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
131. Id.
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In Jean v. Nelson,13 2 the Court of Appeals held the change in pol-
icy constituted a rule which was invalid for failure to comply with
the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA).133 The court rejected the government's argument
that even if the policy change was a "rule" it was exempt due to its
military or foreign affairs function.lu The court also rejected the
contention that the rule was exempt as a "general statement of
policy. '13 5
The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed with the lower court's
holding that the policy was neither discriminatory in intent or effect.
The court stated that plaintiffs could establish a discriminatory prac-
tice in contravention of the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution by showing the official action was at least motivated in
part by a discriminatory purpose.136 Moreover, the court stated that
circumstantial evidence should be used by courts where a patent pat-
tern of discrimination is not evident.13 7 The court continued that
once a prima facie claim of discrimination has been established, the
burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the inference of intentional
discrimination. In the present case, the court concluded that plain-
tiffs' statistical and testimonial evidence made out a prima facie case
and the Government's rebuttal evidence was inadequate to dispel the
showing. 13
132. No. 82-5772 slip op. (11th Cir. April 12, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Cir file).
133. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
134. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (1982).
135. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1982). The court however, disagreed with the
District Court's use of a "substantial impact" test, adopting instead a test which focuses
on the amount of discretion the challenged policy leaves the affected agency. No. 82-
5772, slip op. (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file).
136. No. 82-5772, slip op. (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file).
137. Id.
138. The court also addressed the issues of whether aliens are entitled to notice of
the right to have counsel present at an exclusion hearing and whether the INS is re-
quired to notify such aliens of the right to file for political asylum. Although the court
found no error in the District Court's reliance on the principles of exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies and standing in dismissing the counsel claim, on the merits the court
held that plaintiffs had a right to be notified of their right to apply for asylum. Id. See
also supra notes 119-124 and accompanying text.
The court also addressed the plaintiff's claim of significant restrictions on access to
legal counsel. The court remanded on this issue due to an insufficient factual record, but
not before finding merit in the claim based upon Supreme Court precedent allowing the
exercise of counsel's right of political speech, in the absence of an expectation of compen-
sation, by advising individuals of their legal rights. No. 82-5772, slip op. (available on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file). See also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, (1978); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
Consequences of Wrongful Detention
During the past year, at least one district court recognized that
aliens have a legal remedy, in addition to equitable relief, for wrong-
ful detention. In Chairez v. County of Van Buren,'39 the court held
that aliens wrongfully detained 140 by local police at the behest of the
INS have a cause of action for damages under the INA. The court
utilized the four factors enunciated in Cort v. Ash' to determine
whether the INA implied a private cause of action for INS violation
of the Act."" The District Court found that the four factors were
satisfied and that damages were an appropriate form of relief.
In Gonzales v. City of Peoria,143 the District Court held that the
city was not susceptible to a punitive damages claim by an alien who
was temporarily detained by local police officers for suspected immi-
gration violations. The Court concluded that a state law enforcement
officer may arrest a person upon probable cause that the person has
illegally entered the country and may detain him, provided that fed-
eral authorities are contacted and have instructed state officials to
detain the alien. 44
Possibly encouraged by the holding in Gonzales, the Attorney
General revised a Justice Department policy regarding responsibility
for the enforcement of domestic immigration laws. 45 The new policy
revises one in effect since 1978, and provides for INS cooperation
with local law enforcement agencies in the detention of suspected
violators and cooperation in discovering violations of both federal
and state law.
SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION
Section 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 46 permits
the Attorney General to suspend deportation proceedings if an alien
is physically present in the United States for a continuous period of
not less than seven years; the alien is of good moral character; and
139. 542 F. Supp. 706 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
140. The INS failed to provide plaintiff a timely determination of lawful custody
as required by section 287(a)(2) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §1357(a)(2) (1982); and 8 C.F.R.
§287.3 (1983). 542 F. Supp. at 714-15.
141. 422 U.S. 68 (1975).
142. The factors necessary to find an implied private cause of action are:
I. Whether the statute at issue was enacted for the benefit of the aggrieved
party;
2. Whether the legislative history indicates a creation or denial of such right;
3. Whether the remedy is consistent with the purpose behind the legislation;
4. Whether the cause of action has traditionally been a matter of state law.
Id. at 78.
143. 537 F. Supp. 793, 797 (D. Ariz. 1982).
144. Id. at 797.
145. See 60 INTERPRETER RELEASES 172 (1983).
146. § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982).
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the proposed deportation would result in extreme hardship to the
alien, his spouse, or child who is a citizen or legal resident of the
United States. The Supreme Court considered the physical presence
requirement in Phinpathya v. INS,14 7 and was presented with the
question of whether an alien's absence from the United States may
be considered meaningfully interruptive of his continued physical
presence in this country where the hardship of deportation would be
as severe if the absence had not occurred. 148 The Court did not dis-
pose of the case during its 1982-1983 term. The lower courts, how-
ever, continued to disagree over the procedural and definitional as-
pects of suspension of deportation.
The Eleventh Circuit, confronted with an issue of first impression
regarding the continuous physical presence requirement, held in Fi-
dalgo/Velez v. INS149 that a one-day trip out of the country was
meaningfully interruptive150 of presence in the United States. Peti-
tioner entered the United States in 1968 as a nonimmigrant and
married a U.S. citizen. An immediate relative visa petition5 was
granted in mid 1974. In early 1975 petitioner traveled to Toronto,
Canada for a scheduled interview with a consular officer there, but
she neglected to inform the officer that her citizen husband had died
subsequent to the approval of her visa petition. The immigrant visa
was granted and she returned to the United States the same day.
Deportation proceedings were initiated in 1978 charging Fidalgo-
Velez with entry absent valid entry documents. Both the immigra-
tion judge and the BIA refused her plea for suspension of deporta-
tion on the ground that continuous physical presence had not been
established.
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the denial of suspension of deporta-
tion. The court rejected as contrary to Congressional intent and the
plain language of the provision, the Ninth Circuit's reading of INA§ 244(a)(1) in Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS 52 and Phinpathya v.
147. 673 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 291 (1982).
148. 103 S. Ct. at 291. For additional background on the lower court decisions, see
Synopsis: Significant Developments in the Immigration Laws of the United States 1981-
1982, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 191, 205-07 (1982).
149. 697 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1983).
150. For further discussion of the "meaningfully interruptive" standard, see supra
notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
151. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1982).
152. 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979). See also, Synopsis: Significant Developments
in the Immigration Laws of the United States 1979-1980, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 107-41
(1980).
INS.153 In these cases, the Ninth Circuit gave a liberal interpreta-
tion to § 244(a)(1), holding that the three requirements of continu-
ous physical presence, good moral character, and absence of extreme
hardship, "are only evidentiary on the issue under § 244(a)(1) of
whether an absence reduced the significance of the whole seven-year
period as reflective of the hardship and unexpectedness of exposure
to expulsion."' 54 The court relied heavily on Rosenberg v. Fleuti,55
where the purpose of the trip abroad was one of three significant
factors in determining whether continuous physical presence had
been meaningfully interrupted. The court found it highly relevant
that petitioner crossed the border to attain a visa she knew she was
not entitled to.
In Ramos v. INS,156 the Fifth Circuit addressed the meaning of
the "extreme hardship" requirement of § 244(a)(1). The BIA had
denied the Ramos' application for suspension of deportation for fail-
ure to exhibit extreme hardship if deportation were to occur. The
court recognized that INS v. Wang'57 precludes judicial substantive
review of the Attorney General's "extreme hardship" determination.
However, the court stated that Wang does not foreclose review of the
procedural aspects of the determination158 and reversed the BIA's
decision because the Board failed to fully address all the elements
which constitute a case of extreme hardship. More specifically, the
court noted that noneconomic hardship, including the emotional
trauma of children, asserted hardship to petitioner's parents in the
United States, and the cumulative effect on all persons affected,
must be taken into consideration to ensure a full and fair review of
the extreme hardship element of § 244(a)(1). Moreover, the court
required the BIA, for purposes of appeal, to fully articulate its rea-
soning that extreme hardship has not been established.
153. 673 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 291 (1982). See
supra notes 147-148 and accompanying text.
154. 597 F.2d at 1257.
155. 374 U.S. 449 (1963). See supra notes 23-26, 150 and accompanying text.
156. 695 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1983).
157. 450 U.S. 139 (1981). For a fuller treatment of the case, see Synopsis: Signifi-
cant Developments in the Immigration Laws of the United States 1980-1981, 19 SAN
Di Eo L. REV. 195, 200-02 (1981). See also, Loue, What Went Wrong With Wang?: An
Examination of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Wang, 20 SAN DiEGo L.
REv. 59 (1982).
158. Other courts of appeals have made the same distinction in post-Wang deci-
sions. See, e.g., Prapavat v. INS, 638 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1981), a ffd on rehearing, 662
F.2d 561, 562 (9th Cir. 1982); Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354, 1356-57 (9th
Cir. 1981); Ravancho v. INS, 658 F.2d 169, 174-76 (3d Cir. 1981). Cf. Bueno-Carrillo
v. Landon, 682 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1982) (a reviewing court may overturn a BIA decision
only if there has been an abuse of discretion).
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ENTRY AND EXCLUSION
The INS for many years excluded homosexual aliens under INA §
212(a)(4),159 which provides for the exclusion of aliens afflicted with
psychopathic personality, sexual deviation, or mental defect. How-
ever, once the Surgeon General no longer considered homosexuality,
per se, to be a mental disorder or sexual deviation, and therefore
refused to grant the medical certification 6 ° necessary to exclude an
alien on the basis of § 244(a)(4), the INS initiated a policy of ex-
cluding homosexual aliens on the basis of their own or others' state-
ments regarding sexual preferences.
In Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Committee v. INS,"'1 an incorpo-
rated association contended that the exclusion of homosexual visitors
from entering the country violated the citizens' first amendment
speech rights. The court relied on Kleindeinst v. Mandel,1 62 which
enunciated the standard of review to be applied when INS conduct
pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act is challenged as
unconstitutional. The Court in Kleindeinst stated that in reviewing
the INS action, it would not delve behind the exercise of a discre-
tionary power if the exercise was based on a "facially legitimate and
bona fide reason," '63 nor would the Court balance the justification
for the exercise of the discretion against first amendment interests.
After reviewing the history of exclusion of homosexuals and recog-
nizing the absence of medical grounds for continued exclusion of
such aliens, the court concluded that the INS' policy of excluding
homosexual aliens on the basis of statements regarding their sexual
preference was not based on facially legitimate and bona fide rea-
sons. Moreover, the court found that the plaintiff's first amendment
interests in engaging in the free exchange of ideas and political strat-
egies far outweighed any INS interests in a per se exclusion of ho-
mosexual aliens.1 64
The Kleindeinst standard of review was also employed by a dis-
trict court in resolving the propriety of excluding a Libyan national
without a hearing on national security grounds. In El-Werfalli v.
159. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1982).
160. 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1982) provides that a Public Health Service official must
certify findings of mental or physical defect in a Class A certificate to the INS. The
certificate constitutes the evidentiary basis for exclusion at the exclusion hearing.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (1982).
161. 541 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
162. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
163. Id. at 770.
164. 541 F. Supp at 587-88.
Smith,165 the plaintiff was excluded based upon classified intelligence
information which led to the conclusion that the Libyan aircraft spe-
cialist endangered the welfare and security of the United States
within the meaning of INA section 212(a)(27)."6' The court found
that the classified material revealed facially legitimate and bona fide
reasons for exclusion of the petitioner and stopped short of probing
into its wisdom or basis.
In March of 1983, the INS amended 8 C.F.R. part 214, terminat-
ing the nonimmigrant status of any Libyan entity connected with
aircraft maintenance, flight operation, or nuclear-related training.167
BOND PROCEEDINGS
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) 6 8 the Attorney General may au-
thorize the release of an alien pending deportation upon the posting
of a bond by the alien and agreement to other conditions the Attor-
ney General deems appropriate. Custody, bond, and parole determi-
nations, however, are separate and distinct from deportation pro-
ceedings, which are governed by subsection (b) of section 1252.19
In Gornicka v. INS,1 70 petitioner was released on $2,000 bond
pending deportation proceedings. She appealed the amount of the
bond before an immigration judge7 and the bond was reduced to
$1,500. Petitioner then appealed the decision of the immigration
judge to the BIA, contending that the bond was unnecessary and,
alternatively, excessive. The Board rejected these contentions and
upheld the immigration judge's determination. Petitioner, without
ever having a deportation hearing, applied directly to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.
The court held that an administrative bond determination is not a
"final order of deportation" within 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a),172 which pro-
vides for direct judicial review of final orders of deportation in a
Court of Appeals. Furthermore, the court noted that 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a) provides for special limited review of bond proceedings in
habeas corpus proceedings brought in district court.
In In re Chew,173 respondent appealed to the BIA for review of the
imposition of a bond condition barring him from engaging in unau-
165. 547 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
166. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27)
(1982).
167. 48 Fed. Reg. 10,296-97 (1983).
168. Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1982).
169. Id. § 1252(b).
170. 681 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1982).
171. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(b) provides for review of an initial bond determination by
an immigration judge.
172. Immigration and Nationality Act § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1982).
173. I.D. 2910 (BIA 1982).
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thorized employment. The Board had stated in dicta in In re Vea 174
that once a ruling on modification of the conditions of custody status
had been rendered by an immigration judge, the alien's only re-
course was to appeal to the BIA. This dicta essentially removed au-
thority from the district director to consider requests for change in
the custody status after an immigration judge had acted on such a
request. The Board, upon closer scrutiny, retreated from the dicta of
In re Yea because no regulations foreclose an alien from reapplying
for modification of custody status to the district director once the
immigration judge has been divested of jurisdiction. 175 The Board,
however, reiterated the factors in In re Yea which are to be consid-
ered in determining whether a no-work rider to a bond is appropriate
under 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(ii). 7 6
The INS proposed an amendment to 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2) (ii)'"
which would make a condition against unauthorized employment
mandatory in all bond cases, absent a grant of employment authori-
zation from the district director. This amendment would be applica-
ble to aliens released on bond in deportation or exclusion proceed-
ings. The previous regulation left the inclusion of the condition with
the discretion of the district director and required the prior approval
of the Regional Commissioner.
EMPLOYMENT
Under § 212(a)(14) of the INA'"1 aliens seeking to enter the
United States to perform skilled or unskilled labor are excluded un-
less the Secretary of Labor has determined that (1) there is an insuf-
ficient number of workers in the United States who are qualified for
the position, and (2) the employment of such aliens will not have an
adverse affect on similarly employed workers in the United States.
This section applies to third179 and sixth preference18" visas, as well
174. I.D. 2890 (BIA 1981). See also, Synopsis: Significant Developments in the
Immigration Laws of the United States 1981-1982, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 226 (1980).
175. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(a) and (b) provide that jurisdiction of the immigration
judge lapses seven days after release from custody or by the entry of a final administra-
tive order of deportation.
176. I.D. 2910, slip op. at 3-4. One such condition is the impact of the alien's
employment upon the American labor market. See also In re Toscano-Rivas, 14 I. & N.
Dec. 523 (1972).
177. 48 Fed. Reg. 8,820-21 (1983).
178. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14)
(1982).
179. § 203 (a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3) (1982). Third preference visas are avail-
able to "qualified immigrants who are members of the professions, or who because of
as to nonpreference immigrant aliens.18'
Two circuit Courts of Appeals addressed whether the INS or the
Department of Labor has primary authority to determine job qualifi-
cation. In Madany v. Smith,182 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia held that the INS has primary authority to determine
whether the beneficiary of a third preference visa is qualified as a
registered nurse, regardless of existing labor certification by the De-
partment of Labor. 183 Appellant argued that once the Department of
Labor has granted a labor certification, based on favorable resolution
of the statutory requirements of § 212(a)(14), the INS is powerless
to review the Department of Labor certification' beyond the fact that
a valid certification exists. The court disagreed. The court's analysis
of the regulations promulgated by both agencies and their respective
legislative histories indicated that, while the Department of Labor
may consider job qualification in resolving its statutory mandate, pri-
mary authority for preference classification decisions, of which job
qualification is a part, lies with the INS. The court rejected appel-
lant's argument that the INS had abused its discretion by requiring
more stringent qualifying criteria than did the Department of Labor.
The BIA overruled its previous holding in In re Contopouloss"
that the nature of the duties to be performed is controlling in deter-
mining whether an alien is an H-2 temporary worker in compliance
with INA § 101 (a)(15)(H)(ii). 85 The petitioner provided temporary
employment to technically-oriented firms and petitioned to have his
alien employees classified as temporary labor governed as H-2 non-
immigrant aliens. The Commissioner stated that the nature of the
need for the duties to be performed, not the nature of the duties,
determines the "temporariness" of H-2 applicants. Using this defini-
tion and acknowledging the frequent and recurring demand for ma-
their exceptional ability in the sciences or the arts will substantially benefit prospectively
the national economy, cultural interests, or welfare of the United States ..... Id. (foot-
note omitted).
180. § 203(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § I153(a)(6) (1982). Sixth preferences visas are avail-
able to immigrants "capable of performing specified skilled or unskilled labor ... for
which a shortage of employable and willing persons exists in the United States." Id.(footnote omitted).
181. § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1982). Nonpreference visas are "made
available to other qualified immigrants strictly in the chronological order in which they
qualify." Id. These visas, however, are limited in number in that the preference category
visas are subtracted from the total allocated visas for a year before nonpreference visas
are issued. Id.
182. 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
183. The Ninth Circuit, in K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.
1983), similarly resolved the issue in a case concerning a sixth preference visa petition.
184. 10 I. & N. Dec. 654 (1964).
185. § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii) (1982). The section pro-
vides that an alien is a nonimmigrant if he comes temporarily to the United States to
perform temporary services or labor provided that unemployed persons capable of doing
the same work cannot be found.
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chinists in the industries which the petitioner serviced, the Commis-
sioner denied the petition to classify the machinists as ones
performing temporary services or labor.
LEGISLATION
The Simpson-Mazzoli bill is the most comprehensive immigration
reform legislation since the INA was revamped in 1952. It never
reached a final vote on the floor of the House of Representatives in
the "lame-duck" session of the 97th Congress.186 However, the
Simpson-Mazzoli bill was reintroduced into both houses of Congress
on February 17, 1983 as "The Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1983.1187 The Senate acted quickly in amending and enacting its
version of the bill on May 18, 1983.18 Although the bills as intro-
duced into both houses are substantially similar, differences exist
that may present conflicts once the House of Representatives passes
its version and the bill is reported to a conference committee. These
conflicts include the following:
1. Employer Sanctions: Substantively, both versions of the bill
provide for sanctions against the knowing employment or recruit-
ment of unauthorized aliens. The Senate's version of the bill contains
no sanctions against employers for discriminating on the basis of
alien status or national origin. The House Committee on Education
and Labor, however, recommended such sanctions in its submitted
report of the bill. 8 " The bills also differ over review of civil penalties
and the use of national identification cards in determining employ-
ment eligibility.
2. Adjudication Procedures and Asylum: Both versions of the bill
provide for a new United States Immigration Board to replace the
existing Board of Immigration Appeals in anticipation of increased
immigration litigation subsequent to passage of the Simpson-Mazzoli
bill. Provisions for the structure of the new Board, however, vary.
Although both versions of the bill provide that an alien without doc-
186. The Senate version of the bill, S. 2222, was enacted by a vote of 80-19 on
August 17, 1982. The text of the bill passed by the Senate is contained in 128th CONG.
REC. S10619-31 (daily ed. August 17, 1982).
187. S. 529 was introduced into the First Session of the 98th Congress by Senator
Alan K. Simpson (R-Wyo.), Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immi-
gration and Refugee Policy. H.R. 1510 was introduced by Representative Romano L.
Mazzoli (D-Ky.), Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Ref-
ugees, and International Law. See 60 INTERPRETER RELEASES 150 (1983).
188. The text of the bill enacted by the Senate is contained in 129 CONG. REC.
S6970-6986 (daily ed. May 18, 1983).
189. H.R. REP. No. 115, pt. 4, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
umentation may be excluded without a hearing, absent indication
that the alien desires to apply for asylum, the House bill requires the
examining INS officer to inform the alien of his right to a full hear-
ing of his claim before an Administrative Law Judge.
3. Numerical Limitations on Legal Immigration: Although the
House version lacks substantial changes in the present system of nu-
merical limitations on legal immigrants or the preference system of
admitting such immigrants, the Senate version lists new annual ceil-
ings of 350,000 visas for family reunification and 75,000 visas for
independent immigrants. New formulas for preference and non-
preference allocation are also enumerated in the Senate bill.
4. Nonimmigrant Temporary Workers: 190 The House version, if
enacted, may be in disagreement with the very limited role the Sen-
ate provided for the Secretary of Agriculture in the labor certifica-
tion process and the length of the period for requesting alien
workers.
The 97th Congress passed legislation which allows "Amerasian"
children191 born after 1950 and prior to enactment of the bill' 92 to
immigrate to the United States as immediate relatives or as first or
fourth preference immigrants. A person desiring to come to the
United States under this legislation must provide the Attorney Gen-
eral a guarantee by an adult sponsor that the sponsor will financially
support the alien for five years or until the age of 21, whichever
period is longer.
An alien's eligibility for legal assistance from the Legal Services
Corporation was severely restricted in an appropriations bill' 93 for
fiscal year 1983. The legislation bars legal assistance for aliens un-
less the alien is (1) a resident of the United States, and (2) a lawful
permanent resident; or the spouse, parent, or minor child of a citizen
who is awaiting adjustment of status; or has been admitted as a refu-
gee, or been granted asylum or withholding of deportation.
CONCLUSION
The past year was a very active one in immigration law. The Su-
preme Court invalidated the one-House congressional veto of suspen-
sion of deportations and questioned the validity of all legislative
vetos of administrative determinations. The Court held that exclu-
sion proceedings are the proper forum for determining the admissi-
190. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
191. "Amerasian" children is the euphemism used to describe children born in
Southeast Asia whose fathers are United States citizens.
192. Immigration hnd Nationality Act, Amendment; Certain Children of U.S. Cit-
izens, Admission, Pub. L. No. 97-359, 96 Stat. 1716 (1982).
193. Continuing appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-276, 96 Stat.
1186 (1982).
[VOL. 21: 225, 1983] Synopsis
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
bility of lawful permanent residents after brief visits abroad and that
nonimmigrant aliens are able to establish domicile in the United
States. The Court also decided that states may have standing to pur-
sue declaratory and injunctive relief from violations of the immigra-
tion laws.
The lower federal courts, especially the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, were very active in the criminal procedure area. The
ramifications of the pressures in the immigration area, engendered
by the boatlifts from Caribbean countries, were still being felt by the
courts; detention, asylum, and suspension of deportation were adjudi-
cated by the various circuits. A notable split in the circuit courts
concerning the burden of proof in establishing a fear of persecution'
in an asylum application deepened during the year and should be
resolved by the Supreme Court during its next term.
Congress re-introduced the Simpson-Mazzoli bill and amended the
legislation in many important areas. Legislation concerning Amera-
sian children and access to Legal Service Corporation attorneys was
also promulgated.
DANIEL F. MORRIN

